

<b>London Regional Passengers Committee</b>	<b>LRPC</b>
<b>Sub-Committee Minutes - Confidential</b> London Bridge, Blackfriars and Farringdon-Moorgate Closures Sub-Committee: 3, 5 and 6 April 2000	Agenda No: LRPC: Date: 28.6.00

## **INDEX**

40 Moorgate branch passenger figures

**Confidential Minutes of a meeting of the  
London Bridge, Blackfriars and Farringdon-Moorgate Closures Sub-Committee  
Held on Monday 3, Wednesday 5 and Thursday 6 April 2000  
At the Euston Plaza Hotel, 17-18 Upper Woburn Place, London WC1H 0HT**

**40 Moorgate branch passenger figures**

- 40.1 The Chairman explained that the Sub-Committee wanted to address the implications of passenger loading figures that had been received from Thameslink Rail. They differed greatly from the figures in the SSRA Statement of Reasons. Although that would be only one component of the use of Farringdon station, it would (extrapolated over the next 11 years) suggest far higher usage of the station than the 47,000 that had been quoted. LT had said that a change of even 5% could lead to difficulties.
- 40.2 Kai Hills (SSRA) said he had already seen the numbers, but had not seen the covering letter from Thameslink Rail that suggested that for 8-car trains the counts for a 4-car unit could simply be doubled. That was not correct, because the distribution of passengers on the train was related to where they would exit the station. For Moorgate passengers, this would be the front of the train, so the 8-car trains would probably be empty at the back. Doubling would inflate the figure if the front train was being weighed, or decrease it if it was the rear train. The approved method for using passenger load weighing, for SSRA purposes, was to have an average of at least 3 counts of a fully fitted train, or, if this was impossible, front and rear counts for each train. The Chairman asked what the multiplications should be. Mr Hills replied that, not having observed arrivals at Moorgate on Thameslink trains, he could only guess: about 1.5 would be generous for a front unit, but it would be 3 or 4 for a rear unit.
- 40.3 The Chairman asked whether the SSRA believed Thameslink had not done this properly. Mr Hills replied that the SSRA knew, from the proportion of the fleet that was fitted, that it was unlikely to have a sufficiently robust data set. It was an unfortunate situation, because the SSRA was about to publish the annual terminal census counts, and this year Thameslink had been permitted to use passenger load weighing. The SSRA was accepting the figures, although it was not happy with the way it had been done; it did not find out that they were not robust until too late. Otherwise, the SSRA would not have accepted it, and would have insisted on a manual count to compare the results.
- 40.4 Mike Parker added that the SSRA was not saying that the numbers were incorrect, but was concerned about whether the calculations had been done correctly. It had not been able to discuss this with Thameslink, and (because of the significance of these numbers for this scheme) would need to satisfy itself that the numbers were realistic. The Director remarked that there was no indication as to whether the counts were from front or rear units on any occasion, although the total number of counts was known. Mr Hills replied that on 4-car trains the figures could be taken as reasonable with more than three counts.

- 40.5 The Chairman felt it surprising that the SSRA had not noticed the problem when it had accepted Thameslink's figures previously. Mr Hills replied that this was the first year Thameslink had used passenger load weighing, and the SSRA did not know until it received the data that some trains had inadequate data. This had been in January. The figures had to be published, and manual counts, if organised in January, would have to take place around Easter.
- 40.6 In response to questions, Mr Hills confirmed that this was the first time he had seen doubling suggested, and said that the SSRA had no reservations about the principle of passenger load weighing, which was easily more accurate than manual counts.
- 40.7 Mark Papworth said that Railtrack had three conventional passenger headcounts of people alighting from or boarding Thameslink trains at Farringdon. In 1997, the number of Thameslink boarders and alighters (northbound and southbound) in the peak three hours was 7,646. In 1998 the number was 7,454, and in 1999 it was 8,419. So there was significant consistency.
- 40.8 In response to a question, he said that the 1999 count had been undertaken by LUL on 30 March 1999. The Director remarked that we were now a year on from that. Mr Papworth agreed that a count today would show different numbers. He continued that station designs had a long gestation period. The forecast numbers that Railtrack had used for the Farringdon design were based on numbers from early to mid-1999.
- 40.9 The Senior Research Officer asked for clarification on that point: it appeared that there was no question of whether the actual 1999 demand was in line with what the modelling had predicted, because it had started in 1999 in the first place. Mr Papworth replied that the base data for the modelling was the 1997 data, because that was the last full count available and had been used to calibrate the models. The Senior Research Officer asked whether the 1999 data matched what the model had predicted. Mr Papworth did not have the answer to hand. But his point was that there was consistency in the head counts, and he thought the numbers would not be radically different now.
- 40.10 The Chairman recalled that Railtrack had suggested general passenger growth of about 11% over ten years. Mr Papworth replied that demand was forecast at two levels. There was exogenous growth, which came from the changing market, irrespective of whether Thameslink 2000 happened or not. The average growth across London and the south-east of rail traffic to Central London in the morning peak was 11% between 1997 and 2011. Then there was a second phase, which added in the provision of Thameslink 2000 services and gave the results at the station level. The forecast for Farringdon came out at about 300-400%.
- 40.11 A Member asked whether there was any way of predicting the exogenous growth at Farringdon. Mr Parker said that the modelling had used two different methods. For exogenous growth, the LTS model (a standard transport planning tool) was used to provide a growth figure across the whole of the region. To understand what would happen by adding Thameslink 2000, a different model was used. This was Planet, which was owned by SSRA, and had previously been owned by British Rail. Most commentators felt it gave a better reflection of the rail service and distribution than LTS, which was a more general transport planning tool.

- 40.12 The Chairman asked what the exogenous growth would be at Farringdon. Mark Papworth replied that LTS did not predict growth just at Farringdon. It used areas that were bigger than just Farringdon. The Chairman asked what the figure for that area was. Mr Papworth did not have it to hand, but it could be found.
- 40.13 The Chairman asked for confirmation that the derived growth from Thameslink 2000 was by far the larger factor at Farringdon. Mr Papworth replied that it was. He added that there was not just growth in people travelling, but also people who would go through Farringdon in future because it was more convenient than another route. The Director asked where interchange, as opposed to demand for Farringdon as a destination, had been taken into account in the modelling. Mr Papworth replied that Planet was taking the exogenous forecasts of growth from LTS, and applying them to the transport network. Kai Hills added that Planet included a map of the Underground and of central London buses, and assigned people to that, so it would assign interchange. The Director postulated growth in office space at Liverpool Street or Aldgate; Mr Papworth replied that that assumption would be in LTS, and Planet would say, given that growth, what service the people would use.
- 40.14 The Senior Research Officer asked whether LTS had sufficient resolution to take into account developments at Farringdon, as opposed to developments in the zone of which Farringdon was part. Mark Papworth did not know enough about the model to answer that question, and did not know how large the zone was. The answers could be found if necessary.
- 40.15 A Member suggested that the headcounts for Farringdon that Mr Papworth had referred to were not all consistent; there had been a 12% increase between 1998 and 1999. Mr Papworth replied that by consistent, he had meant the same order of magnitude. His point was that they were not radically different numbers. The Member replied that the sensitivity was important. Mr Papworth replied that Railtrack had been designing a station, from a base of about 8,500 - 9,500 that was capable of handling about 37,000. At that scale of capacity growth, a difference of a few hundred people had little impact.
- 40.16 Mr Parker agreed to evaluate the loading figures, discuss them with Thameslink and return to the Committee with its view and with agreed figures.

**ACTION: SSRA**